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Abstract 
 
 
Previous research on wage penalty for temporary workers has focused on the conditional mean model. 
This paper uses micro data from the 2006 wave of the Survey of Italian Households’ Income and Wealth 
(SHIW) to examine the wage gap between temporary and permanent workers across the whole wage 
distribution. I apply a quantile regression models to understand whether there are glass ceiling or sticky 
floor for fixed-term workers and to test the hypothesis of polarization of wage profile by contract status. 
I also exploit a counterfactual decomposition analysis to investigate whether the gap is attributed to 
differences in characteristics or to differences in coefficients effect.  
A possible source of misspecification may arise, the endogenous selection in temporary status. In order 
to address the selectivity bias, I adopt an IV specification and a variant of the traditional Heckman (1978) 
dummy endogenous variable for the quantile framework. 
The main finding is a sticky floor effect, in the sense that the wage penalty for temporary workers is 
wider at the bottom of earnings distribution and in particular the decomposition method shows how the 
coefficients effect is decreasing in the upper half of wage profile. The analysis by educational level and 
by sector confirms the sticky floor effect. Finally correcting for endogenous self-selection in temporary 
contract slightly modifies the magnitude of wage gap, without changing the main patterns evidenced in 
the standard quantile regression. 
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Introduction 
 
 
During the last decades, European countries witnessed a significant expansion of temporary 
employment. The growth of fixed-term contracts has been triggered by the process of 
liberalization which has contributed to lessen the rigid employment protection legislation and 
to make more flexible the labour market. The increase of atypical contracts has generated a 
concern over its effects on labour market equilibrium. In particular the relative situation of 
temporary workers has played a central role in the numerous studies carried out in the last 
years on fixed-term jobs and their consequence in term of wages and employment transition.  
Furthermore fixed-term contracts expire automatically at the end of the term fixed without any 
firing cost for the employer and this means that temporary workers suffer a higher risk of 
unemployment and of income loss. According to the theory of compensating differentials, 
different working conditions in presence of the same level of competence should correspond to 
a wage premium for temporary workers to offset the disadvantages. However the empirical 
evidence shows a wage penalty for temporary jobs and in recent years several studies have 
investigated on this topic, finding negative earnings differentials for atypical jobs. 
This paper aims to investigate the differences between the wage structures of temporary and 
permanent workers in the Italian labour market. In particular the focus is to analyze the wage 
gaps across the whole pay distribution to understand whether there are “glass ceilings” and 
“sticky floors” for fixed-term workers in Italy. The pay gap may be different in the upper and 
lower tails of earnings distribution. The glass ceiling effect refers to a wider wage gap at the 
top of distribution, suggesting that temporary in the high-income jobs are paid less than their 
permanent counterparts. In contrast a sticky floor effect refers to an opposite situation, when 
the gap widens at the bottom of the wage distribution. I hypothesize a sort of polarization of 
wage profile by contract status, distinguishing between temporary and stable job, and I try to 
emphasize the extent to which work duration affects the location and shape of the conditional 
wage distribution.   
A growing number of studies has attempted to analyze the phenomenon and promoted greater 
understanding of its evolution. I evaluate the presence of a wage penalty for temporary 
contracts in Italy and whether the wage gap between two groups of workers is due to the 
distribution of employment contracts in the different type of jobs or whether they present 
different returns for the same characteristics. 
Most of the empirical studies that have investigated the permanent wage premium have looked 
exclusively at the conditional mean models and considered different ways of addressing the 
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selection issue related to contract type. I use the quantile regression technique to explore the 
source of heterogeneity in the wage gaps between temporary and permanent workers. 
Differently from the standard OLS approach, the quantile regression (hence after QR) 
framework provides a more flexible method to characterizing the effect of temporary status on 
different percentiles of the conditional wage distribution, thus enabling to shed further light on 
the location, scale and shape of the log wage distribution. Another advantage of QR model 
concerns the coefficient estimates that are more robust to outliers of dependent variable and, in 
presence of non-normal errors, may be more efficient than OLS estimates (Buchinsky, 1998). 
To examine the pay gap across wage profile, one has to go beyond the traditional OLS 
regression and Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and to exploit several methods available to 
decompose the wage differential at each quantile. Thus I perform the Machado–Mata 
techniques (hence after MM) for QR model to assess the relevance of glass ceiling or sticky 
floor hypothesis and to investigate the magnitude of difference in earnings between temporary 
and permanent workers. The MM techniques is applied using the procedure proposed by Melly 
(2006) to study the differences in distribution in the quantile regression framework. The 
empirical analysis decomposes the difference between the temporary and permanent log wage 
distributions into one component based on the difference in labour market characteristics 
(endowments effect) and one component based on the difference in rewards for the same 
characteristics (coefficient effect). The idea is to generate a counterfactual temporary log wage 
density that would arise if fixed-term workers were given permanent’s labour market 
characteristics but continued to be paid like temporary.  
Nevertheless a possible source of misspecification may arise in this framework, the potential 
endogeneity of the temporary status which may bias the QR estimates, given that the role of 
unobservable individual characteristics cannot be ignored as well as the potential correlation 
between the temporary dummy variable and the error term in the wage equation. In order to 
address the issue of endogenous selection in temporary contract, this work examines the 
empirical implication of allowing the dummy variable for contract type to be correlated with 
the error term. Thus I adopt an IV method and a variant of the Heckman (1978) dummy 
endogenous variable model to correct the bias induced by the endogeneity of contract status. 
In particular for the IV approach I present a traditional 2SLAD estimator1 and a Quantile 
Treatment Effect (QTE) estimation strategy (as Abadie et al., 2002) that allows to look at the 
impact of temporary status throughout the income distribution. 
                                                 
1 The 2SLAD estimator has been used in the literature about returns to schooling to correct the endogeneity of 
education level (see for example Arias et al. 2001; Girma and Kedir, 2005)  but the fitted values approach may 
present some problem whether the treatment effect widely differs across quantile. 
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Differently the traditional self-selection issue, proposed by Heckman (1978) and present in the 
empirical studies on wage differentials, has been revised from Buchinsky (1998, 2001) in the 
QR framework, introducing a two-step in semi-parametric process to correct for the self-
selection. In this paper I apply a variant of the Buchinsky approach to account for the 
selectivity bias in my wage equation.2 
The dataset used here to explore wage differentials is the 2006 wave of the Survey of Italian 
Households’ Income and Wealth (SHIW), a representative survey carried out by the Bank of 
Italy. Therefore I focus in my empirical exercise on the sub sample of employees with age 
between 15 and 65 years that are employed on temporary or permanent basis. In particular I 
wish to understand whether the temporary jobs evidence a wage penalty with respect to open-
end contracts and whether this gap is due to different individual characteristics or to 
discrimination in the labour market. 
Several studies have looked at the pay gap between temporary and permanent workers and in 
particular for the Italian labour market (Picchio, 2006, 2007; Tanda e Rossetti, 2007) they find 
the existence of a wage penalty for fixed-term jobs, lower with respect to other countries. But 
all these studies analyse pay gap at the conditional mean, which may hide significant 
differences at the bottom or top  of the wage distribution. This study complements and adds to 
the previous research in many ways. Works on how much the temporary status wage penalty 
varies across the wage distribution have emerged recently and comparing wage not only at the 
mean is important to correctly capture the presence of segregation or discrimination and to 
evaluate the impact of individual characteristics at different point of earnings distribution.  
In addition I investigate more in depth the link between educational level and wage penalty 
that should be of great interest especially for policy makers for whom it is crucial to better 
understand the effects of flexibility in the Italian labour market. My study also complements 
Picchio (2006), which used the 2002 wave of SHIW to examine the wage differentials between 
temporary and permanent workers. Picchio (2006) looks at the wage penalty for temporary 
worker and accounts for self-selectivity bias in contract status dummy applying IV and sample 
selection models in a conditional mean framework. So this paper also contributes to the 
literature on the temporary-permanent wage differentials for the Italian labour market, 
controlling also for endogenous contract type in a QR framework.   
The main empirical findings are in favour of the sticky floor hypothesis, in the sense that the 
wage gap between temporary and permanent workers is wider at the bottom of the distribution, 
                                                 
2 The selectivity issue in wage gap literature has been widely account in several works. Previous studies has applied 
a variant of the traditional semi-parametric Bucinsky approach, exploiting several estimator (probit or other semi-
parametric model) to calculate the power expansion of inverse Mills ratio in the first step. Different example are 
Arulampalam et al. (2006) about union wage premia and Melly (2006) and Hyder and Reilly (2005) for public 
sector pay gap. 
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while at the top it is not significant. In particular the Machado-Mata decomposition shows how 
the coefficients effect (a measure of discrimination) is monotonically decreasing after the 30th 
percentile, especially for women. Moreover the differences in the upper tail of distribution are 
explained by difference in labour market characteristics, as for example education, experience 
and occupation. The analysis by educational level and for sector confirms a significant 
negative coefficient effect for temporary workers in the lower tail of earnings distribution, 
which may indicate the “port of entry” nature of temporary employment, in particular for 
young and high-skilled workers. Finally correcting for endogenous self-selection in temporary 
contract modifies the magnitude of the differentials, without changing the main patterns, as QR 
regression. 
The plan for the paper is as follows. In section 2 I discuss the econometric model and the 
specification of quantile regression, as well as the decomposition method applied. Section 3 
describes the dataset used for the empirical exercise, the rule for sample selection and presents 
some descriptive statistics. Section 4 reports the empirical findings and the decomposition of 
wage differential and finally section 5 draws the conclusions. 
  
 
2) The econometric model 
 
2.1) Quantile regression model 
 
In this section I disentangle the contribution of workers’ characteristics and contract type on 
wage setting process in the Italian labour market. Several contributions have examined the 
wage gap between temporary and permanent workers using a standard OLS framework3 and 
taking a Mincerian standard specification 4  as starting point. It consists on estimating a 
traditional wage equation, including a dummy variable for temporary contract. 
To investigate whether the wage penalty (or premium) varies at different points of earnings 
profile, I deviate from this practice by looking at the effect of con tract type and other 
covariates on the whole wage distribution, thus employing a quantile regression model 
(Koenker and Basset, 1998). In addition, linear regression, as OLS and other standard 
statistical techniques, focus only on mean effect, emphasizing the impact of each covariate as a 
                                                 
3 For instance Picchio (2006, 20007), Tanda and Rossetti (2007) for Italy, Jahn (2008) for Germany,  De La Rica 
(2004), Davia and Hernanz (2004) for Spain and Van Der Wiel (2008) for Netherlands. 
4 The specification of the wage equation is an extension of well-known Mincer model of wage determination and it 
controls for age and its square, work experience (and its square), tenure in the present job (and its square), five 
education dummies, a dummy for contract type (temporary or permanent), region of residence, demographic 
characteristics (a marital status dummy and a dummy on whether one is the head of household, firm size dummies, 
industry dummies and three occupation dummies (white collar, blue collar and manager). Summary statistics are 
presented in table 1. 
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simple “location shift” (Melly, 2005). Therefore the quantile regression (QR) is a natural 
extension of OLS estimation of conditional mean model and it describes the conditional 
quantile regression as a linear function of observed heterogeneity, providing a detailed 
description of the conditional wage distribution.  
I specify the thθ  ( )10 << θ  quantile of the log wage distribution ( iw ), conditional on a 
vector of covariates ix  as 
θθ βiii xxwq =)|(  
implying 
θθ µβ += ii xw ,   with  0)|( =ixq θθ µ , 
where θµ  is the error term of thθ  conditional quantile that is assumed to be zero.5 Moreover 
QR results are robust to outliers and heavy tailed distributions. 
The quantile estimator of θβ  solve the following minimization problem: 
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−+−= ∑ ∑
≥ <β ββ
θ βθβθβ
ii iiXwi Xwi
iiii XwXw
: :
1minargˆ . 
 
The minimization problem can be solved into a GMM framework which has been applied to 
demonstrate consistency and asymptotic normality of θβˆ and to define its asymptotic 
covariance matrix. Thus, I estimate a single equation QR model  as 
 
θθθ µβα ++= iii xtempw  
 
where itemp  is a dummy indicating contract type and equal to one whether the worker has a 
fixed-term job and zero if permanent. The set of QR coefficients provides the rates of return to 
the corresponding characteristics at the selected quantile of the conditional wage distribution. 
If the impact of temporary contracts is the same across the entire conditional wage distribution, 
I would expect θα  not vary for different θ . In addition, the variations in θα  across different 
quantiles could reflect heteroscedasticity. Moreover, if heteroscedasticity concerns interaction 
between temporary contract and unobserved determinants of wages, QR model allows to 
                                                 
5 This is the only distributional assumption on θµ . QR model avoids the restrictive assumption that the error terms 
are identically distributed at all points of the conditional distribution. 
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derive how the fixed-term contract effect and unobserved heterogeneity impact on individual 
outcome across different quantiles.6 
Finally, the single equation model is based on the assumption that the wage determination 
process is identical for both permanent and temporary workers, i.e. the returns to individual 
characteristics are the same in both contract type. In order to test this restriction, I estimate a 
model interacting each independent variable with the contract type dummy and I investigate 
whether the interaction terms are significantly and jointly different from zero. The null 
hypothesis is rejected, thus the above mentioned assumption is violated. In practice the single 
equation QR model may be misleading and separate wage equation for each group are required.  
 
 
2.2) Quantile regression decomposition 
 
Once I have estimated the QR coefficients, as in the OLS approach, the differences at selected 
quantiles of the wage distribution between two groups of workers can be decomposed into one 
component due to labour market characteristics and one component that is based on 
differences in rewards. In addition the implementation of quantile decomposition analysis may 
provide further evidence to understand whether the unobserved heterogeneity is a source in 
explaining the nature of the existent wage gap.7 The usual Blinder-Oaxaca methodology is 
based on the OLS property that the mean wage conditional on the average characteristics of the 
sample is equal to the unconditional mean wage. Basically the exact decomposition of the 
average wage gap between both group of workers is due to the validity of this property. Hence 
incorporating the QR framework in this decomposition techniques based on conditional mean 
model may be misleading.  
Furthermore the unconditional thθ quantile wage is equal to its thθ  quantile wage conditional 
on the vector of explanatory variables at the same quantile plus the average of those 
individuals’ error terms as  
θθθ µβ += iii xxwq )|( . 
But the error term in QR is not zero, so the exact decomposition of the wage differential (as in 
Blinder-Oaxaca methodology) cannot be performed at different quantiles. 
                                                 
6 In order to prove the heteroscedasticity hypothesis, i.e. the case in which slope coefficients are different for the 
same variables across quantile, I test that the estimated coefficients vectors from different QR are statistically 
different from one another.  
7 In practice I investigate whether the existence of sticky floor or glass ceiling is due to the prevalence of a 
composition effect (differences in labour market characteristics, as educational level, experience, occupation) or a 
price effect (differences in rewards, i.e. whether the rate of return for the same characteristics is different). 
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More recently, Machado and Mata (2005) have proposed a quantile-based decomposition 
method, which combines quantile regression with bootstrap approach and it has been 
addressed in a wide range of empirical studies.8 This procedure extends the traditional Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition on conditional mean wage to the whole wage distribution by allowing 
to overcome the above mentioned problem. Assuming linearity9 between the quantiles of the 
dependent variable iw  and the covariates iX , the main methodological contribution of the 
Machado-Mata (MM) procedure is to derive an estimator of counterfactual unconditional wage 
distribution. 
In this paper I follow Melly (2006) who suggests a modified procedure of MM technique to 
decompose differences at different quantiles of the unconditional distribution. Instead of 
randomly drawing θ  from an uniform )1,0(U , the conditional distribution is estimated by 
quantile regression for a large number of selected sθ , such that Jj θθθ ,..,,..,1  (with j = 1,…, J) 
and then the conditional (log) wage distribution is integrated over the range of the explanatory 
variables. Let )ˆ,...,ˆ,...,ˆ(ˆ
1 Jj θθθ ββββ =  be the QR coefficients estimated at J different 
quantiles, 10 << Jθ  (with j= 1,…, J) separately for both temporary and permanent workers. 
Then, integrating over all observations and over all quantiles, Melly (2006) derives an 
estimator of the thθ  unconditional quantile of (log) wage as follows 
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ≥≤−= ∑∑
= =
−
N
i
J
j
ijji qxN
qXq
j
1 1
1 )ˆ(1)(
1:inf),,( θβθθθβ θθ  
 
where 1(• ) is the indicator function. 
In what follows, using the above estimator for unconditional distribution, Melly (2006) 
estimates the counterfactual distribution by replacing either the estimated parameters of the 
distribution of characteristics of permanent workers with those of temporary workers. In 
addition the difference at each quantile of the unconditional distribution can be separate into 
one component that calculates the difference in the rewards that the two groups (temporary and 
permanent workers) receive for their labour market characteristics (coefficients effect) and one 
                                                 
8 Other decomposition procedures have been provided in the literature in order to disentangle the sources of 
differences in wage distribution. For instance, the plug-in methods of Juhn et al. (1993), based on parametric 
regression, or Di Nardo et al. (1996), that exploit sample reweighting to apply a semi parametric model. However 
numerous empirical studies have mainly focused on the Machado-Mata technique to decompose differences along 
the whole wage distribution, exploiting quantile regression framework.      
9 This means that the thθ  conditional quantile is correctly specified as θθ βiii xxwq =)|(  ∀  )1,0(∈θ . 
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component that is based on differences in labour market characteristics between temporary and 
permanent workers (characteristics effect):  
 ( )θβ ,, ttixq - ( ) =θβ ,, ppixq )],(),([)],(),([ ppptpttt xqxqxqxq θθθθθθθθ ββββ −+−  
 
where t = temporary, p = permanent, the first brackets measure the difference in the rewards 
that the two groups receive for their labour market characteristics, exploiting the counterfactual 
distribution, while the second brackets measure the impact of differences in labour market 
characteristics between fixed-term and permanent workers. 10  Overall, the Melly (2006) 
decomposition generalizes the traditional Blinder-Oaxaca approach and illustrates how 
differences in rewards or in labour market characteristics affect the wage gap between the two 
groups across the entire distribution. However an important disadvantage of this methodology 
is that, unlike the classic Blinder-Oaxaca, it cannot be used to separate the contribution of each 
variable, thus I can report only the total endowment and coefficients effect for each selected 
quantile.        
 
 
2.3) The Endogeneity issue in contract type 
 
As widely discussed in the literature, standard QR results may be biased due to the 
endogeneity of contract type. In practice, if the choice of working under a temporary or a 
permanent contract is not exogenous and the workers do not have the same probability of 
being hired under each type of contract, a self-selection bias may arise due to the non random 
distribution of employment contracts. Indeed the role of workers’ unobserved characteristics 
on both wages and contract type selection cannot be ignored and accounting for endogenous 
selection may be necessary to correct the bias mentioned above.  
A further potential source of misspecification derives from a sample selection problem. The 
information on wages is only observable for wage earners, i.e. for those individuals who 
decide to participate to the labour market. Moreover, being a wage earner may be a 
characteristic distributed not randomly across the population and whether the error term of the 
labour market participation model is correlated with the error term of the wage equation, the 
QR may yield biased estimates even if the endogeneity of contract type is controlled for, due to 
a sample selection distortion.  
                                                 
10 For a more detail description of this decomposition approach see Melly (2006). I use Stata package rqdeco (Melly, 
2007), estimating 100 quantile regressions in the first step and then to obtain consistent standard errors I bootstrap 
the results with 100 replications. 
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Therefore, to account for the potential endogenous selection in temporary contract, I replicate 
the analysis, exploiting an IV approach and a self-selection model, and in the next two section 
I will describe the estimation strategy used to deal with endogeneity issue. 
 
 
2.3.1) An extension of IV: the Quantile Treatment Effect 
 
Several studies on wage differentials have dealt with the possible non-random selection in 
temporary contracts and have used different estimation strategy in order to account for the 
endogeneity bias. In particular an IV approach has been adopted to correct for the endogenous 
self-selection in the literature for the Italian labour, using different excluded instruments. For 
instance, as instrument, Tanda and Rossetti (2007) use information on whether the workers 
enters in the labour market after the Treu reform (so being potentially exposed to temporary 
contracts) or not, exploiting the timing of change in labour market regulation. Further, Picchio 
(2006) estimates different IV specifications, using an instruments on the job searching dummy 
variable and whether the worker has taken sick days or not.11  
In addition, the issue of endogenous variable is not straightforward in the quantile regression 
framework and thus to address the self-selection bias, differently by previous literature, I adopt 
an instrumental variable quantile regression (IVQR) approach that looks at the quantile 
treatment effect (QTE) of being a temporary worker on wages. 
Moreover, to perform the QTE estimator, I decide to follow Picchio (2006) and, as instrument, 
in this paper I use the on the job searching dummy variable, which is equal to one whether the 
employee is looking for another work or zero otherwise. The consistency of IV estimator is 
based on the correlation between the instrument and the endogenous dummy variable (being a 
temporary worker) and on its exogeneity. The searching dummy variable is supposed to be 
positively correlated to the contract type indicator, because temporary workers should have a 
higher incentive to search, giving their higher probability to be laid off at the end of the 
contract. Furthermore the first stage of a 2SLS estimator confirms that the on the job searching 
and fixed-term contract are positively correlated, with a positive estimated coefficient, 
statistically different from zero.12 
                                                 
11 In this case the author provides both an IV and a GMM specifications in the study of wage differentials between 
temporary and permanent workers. GMM estimation strategy allows to test for the jointly validity of the 
instruments with the Hansen – Sargan test of over identification, so providing a robustness check on endogeneity of 
contract type. Moreover, he also discusses the possibility to include, as instrument, information on whether the 
employee has never paid social security contributions.  
12 An issue much debated in the IV framework is the weakness of the instruments used in the empirical analysis, as 
discussed in Staiger and Stock (1997). For instance, in this specific case, with one endogenous variable and one 
excluded instrument, the model fall into the just identified case and thus the validity of the instrument cannot be test. 
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The extension of instrumental variable methods to the estimation of conditional quantile model 
is discussed firstly in Amemiya (1982).13 In practice, the estimation strategy consists in using 
the fitted values from a first step least squares regression of the endogenous variable on the 
instruments as covariate in the standard quantile regression at the second step. In literature this 
model is the so-called fitted value approach (2LAD). But, applying a 2LAD estimator, 
analogous to a 2SLS one, it will most likely result into biased and underestimated standard 
errors. Thus, to recover consistent standard errors, an approach may be to bootstrap them in 
both the first stage and in the second stage regressions.14 Based on the above model and for a 
comparison device, in this paper I estimate a 2LAD model where the first stage is a regression 
of the endogenous variable (temporary contract) on the exogenous ones (including the 
instrument) with a probit model, while the second stage is a linear quantile regression with the 
fitted value for temporary status.15  
However, as suggested in previous studies, the fitted value approach is not consistent whether 
the treatment effect differs across quantile. Other alternative approaches of IVQR estimator 
have been discussed in the literature (for a detailed description see Frolich and Melly, 2008; 
Melly, 2006). The subject of quantile regression with endogenous variables has been 
investigated by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) who provide a model of IVQR in presence 
of discrete endogenous variable. But, as discussed in the introduction, I adopt a quantile 
treatment effect (QTE) model, following Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002) approach, that 
allows to look at the impact of contract type throughout the wage distribution, controlling for 
endogenous self-selection in temporary contract. The comparison of both models shows that 
Abadie et al. (2002) impose more restrictive conditions on the selection equation but allow for 
heterogeneity in responses.16 Therefore I exploit the peculiar feature of QTE approach in order 
to emphasize the heterogeneous impact of flexible contracts across the wage profile. 
                                                                                                                                             
Alternatively, as suggested by Picchio (2006), on the job searching could have a direct effect on wages whether, for 
example, the employer decides to offer an higher wage to avoid that the worker accepts another job. Therefore, in 
this case, the IV estimator is not consistent. In order to make the Quantile Treatment Effect (QTE) approach more 
robust, I have also run a further specification in which the instrument used is the dummy variable sick, equal to one 
if the employee has taken days for sick and zero otherwise, as proved in Picchio (2006). The results are quite similar 
and the main patterns do not change. Finally, to overcome the possible weakness of the instrument, one could use 
the lagged incidence of temporary employment by region, skill and sector to control for local availability of 
temporary job by skill and sector. But, to exploit the QTE estimator proposed by Abadie et al. (2002), I haveto use a 
binary instrument and so the on the job searching seem to be a quite robust choice.   
13 Amemiya (1982) has considered quantile regression model combined with an endogenous variable, reporting the 
consistency and asymptotic normality of a 2LAD estimator, but having in mind a conditional median regression 
(LAD model) 
14 Arias et al. (2001) use the bootstrap approach to obtain consistent standard errors when they investigate return to 
schooling with instrumental variable quantile regression. A similar framework is udes by Garcia et al. (2001) in a 
study on gender wage gap applying QR model. 
15 Both stage are calculated using the bootstrap technique with 100 replications. 
16 I mean heterogeneity conditional on X and the quantile of interest, while both estimators allow for different 
treatment effects at different quantiles (see also Melly, 2006) 
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Abadie et al. (2002) propose a parametric estimator, based on the local average treatment 
effect (LATE) model of Imbens and Angrist (1994), which can be applied only to a specific 
case: a binary endogenous treatment variable D and a binary instrument Z. Abadie et al. (2002) 
provide conditions under which a Quantile Treatment Effect (QTE) model can be estimated:  
1. Independence assumption, i.e. ( )0101 ,,, DDYY  is jointly independent of Z given X. 
2. Non trivial assignment, ( ) 1|10 <=< XZP   
3. [ ] [ ]XDEXDE || 01 ≠  
4. Monotonicity assumption, i.e. ( ) 1|01 =≥ XDDP  
Thus for each θ  ( )10 << θ  there exist θδ  and θβ  such that    
 
( ) θθθ βδ '01,,| XDDDDXYq +=> , 
 
where ),,|( 01 DDDXYq >θ  denote the θ -quantile of Y given X and D for compliers. Under 
these conditions, I can compute a consistent estimator of θδ  and θβ .  
The four conditions described above are derived from Angrist and Imbens (1994) in order to 
recover the local average treatment effect (LATE) interpretation of 2SLS.17  
Under these assumptions, Abadie et al. (2002) identify the marginal distribution of the 
potential outcomes for the sub-population of compliers and they suggest that the conditional 
quantile treatment effect can be estimated as a weighted quantile regression: 
∑ −−= )(.minarg)ˆ,ˆ( , δβρδβ τδβ iiiAAIiIVIV DXYW  
 
where 
)|1Pr(
)1(
)|1Pr(1
)1(
1
i
ii
i
iiAAI
i XZ
ZD
XZ
ZD
W =
−−=−
−−= .18 
 
More generally, the QTE approach captures the impact of an intervention on the whole 
distribution for individuals whose treatment status is changed by a binary instrument.19 
                                                 
17  In this framework, the first assumption implies that searching for another job is randomly assigned. In practice I 
cannot test this assumption, but I find that temporary workers are not significantly different from each other whether 
they search for another job or not. The third condition simply requires a significant first stage, as I explained in this 
section. The fourth condition basically implies that there not exists workers for whom searching another job reduces 
the probability to be temporary. In addition the model requires the presence of compliers and the treatments effects 
can be identified only for this group.    
18 A preliminary estimator for )|1Pr( ixz =  is necessary to implement QTE approach, but some of the weights 
may be negative. Moreover, Abadie et al. (2002) use a series estimator, while the Stata package IVQTE used in the 
estimation procedure, applies a local estimator, setting to zero the estimated weight that are negative in finite 
samples. 
19 Finally, I exploit bootstrap technique with 100 replication in order to obtain robust standard errors. 
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2.3.2) Self-selection approach: an extension of Dummy Endogenous Variable Model 
 
To guarantee the robustness of QR estimates, I need to account for a potential self-selection  
bias. Indeed if I do not correct for endogenous selection, usual QR risks yielding biased 
estimates, given that the disturbance term and the independent variables in the wage equation 
could be correlated. Either through a self-selection by workers or sample selection by 
employers, the location of individuals in either contract type may not be considered as the 
result of a random process.  
For the QR model, I control for endogenous selection by applying a variant of the standard 
Heckman two-step procedure (1978), as it was introduced by Buchinsky (1998, 2001) and 
based on a non parametric method. There is currently little consensus regarding the most 
appropriate correction procedure for selectivity bias in QR model, also exploiting a higher 
order series expansion, based on the inverse Mills’ ratio.  
Nevertheless this approach presents some complications that arise in regard to identifying the 
constant term in such wage regression models when higher order terms are used to capture 
selection bias. To get unbiased estimates of θβ , it is necessary to introduce an extra term in 
the quantile wage equation to correct for selectivity as evidenced:  
 
θθθθ εβ ++== )()|( ' ghxxxwq iii  
where  
)0,|()( >≡ gxuqgh iθθθ  
such that 0)0,|( =>gxq iiεθ . 
Following the two-step Buchinsky approach, the )(ghθ  is approximated by a power series 
whose coefficients has to be estimated and should define a function which is larger when the 
impact of unobservable is larger. This function is the inverse Mill’s ratio, being small for those 
with an high probability of being temporary and increasing monotonically as the probability of 
being temporary reduces. As exclusion variable in the first step, I adopt on the job searching 
dummy variable.20 Hence I control for the selectivity bias in QR wage equation expanding 
)(ghθ  as a power series in the inverse Mill’s ratio. 
In the first step I have to estimate the probability of workers being in temporary or permanent 
contract. The traditional method in the selection step uses a semi-parametric least square which 
                                                 
20 Whether I suppose that there not exist exogenous variables which account for the selection into temporary 
contracts and which are excluded from the wage equation, the identification of the self-selection model derive from 
a distributional assumption, i.e. the non linearity of the correction term (hazard term). 
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makes no assumptions about the distribution of the residuals. However a different strategy is 
followed in this paper, where I apply two ordinary probit selection equations (distinguishing 
by region, i.e. North vs. Centre-South) similarly to Heckman (1979) and from there derive the 
bias correcting factor (i.e. the inverse Mill’s ratio), as in Arumpalam et al. (2006). In the 
second step, a linear quantile regression is performed by additionally including the derived 
correcting factor. The )(ghθ  function is approximated by the inverse Mill’s ratio and its 
square. A different model specification with a series of power 3 (of Mill’s ratio) is tested and 
the result is similar.  
 
 
3) Dataset and descriptive statistics 
 
The empirical analysis has been carried out also on the 2006 wave of the Survey of Italian 
Households’ Income and Wealth (Shiw), a nationally representative survey conducted every 
two years since 1989 from the Bank of Italy. It covers 7,768 households composed of 19,951 
individuals and 13,009 income-earners, providing information about individual and job 
characteristics, contract type (temporary, interim and permanent work), the average monthly 
wage and the hour worked. The 2006 wave of SHIW dataset covers 7,236 employed workers 
of which 5,808 employees and 1,424 self-employed workers. 
To investigate the impact of temporary contracts on wages, I select the sub-sample of 
employed workers but removing the self-employed worker since their earnings are driven from 
more complex factors, as taxation, and they are structurally different from employees. Then I 
excluded observation lying in the first and in the last percentiles of the weekly working hours 
and yearly earnings respectively. Further I consider only individual with a working age 
between 15 and 65 years, excluding observations which have missing values for some 
covariates. 
The main variable is the type of contract itemp , a dummy variable equal to one whether the 
individual is fixed-term or interim worker and equal to 0 if the individual has an open-end 
contract. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average hourly wage, defined 
combining the information provided by the SHIW on the yearly earnings and average working 
hours. In particular employees are asked to specify how many months they are worked during 
the year and in the same way the average weekly working hours including overtime. 
Differently fringe benefits are removed from total earned income, which is net of taxes and 
social security contribution. Exploiting this information I can compute the logarithm of net 
hourly wage for all employees in the sample, both temporary and permanent.  
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In order to draw a picture of temporary work and wage gap in Italy, I present some descriptive 
statistics, computed using the 2006 wave of SHIW. Table 1 shows the profile of employees, 
distinguishing then between temporary and permanent workers. Employment, permanent one 
in particular, follows a stronger “gender pattern”. Further the level of education is higher on 
average for permanent workers with more than 51% that have at least an high school 
qualification while for temporary the same percentage is around 47%.  
Regarding the age profile, fixed-term jobs are diffused among the youths, with more than 70% 
of temporary workers having less than 40 years. Differently the open-end works are 
concentrated among the adults where more than 50% is older than 40 years. This clearly 
illustrates the strategy of flexibility at the margin, with an higher diffusion of temporality rate 
among the weaker categories, as young workers, women and immigrants. 
From a macro-region analysis, table 1 reveals how in the Southern there are the 44% of 
temporary workers, while only 24% of permanent ones, so confirming the dual structure of 
Italian labour market. Moreover the 55% of permanent workers are resident in the North.  
Then the distribution of workers among occupations is related to one of the skill levels: high 
qualified worker (manager) and white collar tend to register lower temporality than unskilled 
workers and blue collars. And last but not least fixed-term employment is quite unequally 
spread across sectors and different firm size. Thus it common in building and in agriculture 
and it is likewise used by small and medium firm up to 50 employees. On the opposite extreme 
public services and industry and mining are the ones that register the highest portion of 
permanent position, together with large firm, higher than 50 employees. 
Table 2 displays a picture of the unconditional wage dispersion for temporary and permanent 
workers at various percentiles of the distribution (10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and median). I also 
show a measure of the wage dispersion, the 0.9-0.1 spread for both contractual status. The 
unconditional log hourly wage evidences a wider gap at the bottom of distribution, which 
decreases as I consider the upper tail of distribution. Moreover the spread 0.9-0.1 is higher for 
temporary than for permanent workers. Hence the data suggests the presence of a “glass floor” 
hypothesis, exhibiting a stronger wage differential between temporary and permanent at the 
lower percentile of distribution. 
The figure 1a and 1b provide a visual summary of the temporary and permanent wage 
distribution and the density functions were estimated using an Epanechinov kernel estimator. It 
can be seen from these figures that the distributions are quite distinct between contractual 
types. The permanent earnings distribution is characterized by a higher density function around 
the mode and a lower dispersion with respect to temporary distribution. But to control for the 
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effects of differences in the distribution of worker characteristics between contract type, I look 
at the quantile regression model in the next section.  
 
 
4) The empirical results 
 
Labour market literature on wage differentials has recently discovered the importance of 
controlling for the difference in pay gap along the whole distributions, given that wide 
differentials may arise at the bottom or at the top of distribution (for example see Melly, 2006; 
Arulampalam et al. 2006). In the quantile regression analysis two main effects may be 
identified. A “glass ceiling” effect is identified, in this study, when temporary workers, who 
are otherwise similar to permanent ones, tend to fall behind permanent at the top of wage 
distribution, while a “sticky floors” phenomenon is identified when the gap between temporary 
and permanent workers widens at the bottom of distribution. In the next paragraphs I present 
the quantile estimates with and without sample selection and the wage gap decomposition, 
applying the Machado-Mata techniques.    
 
4.1.) Quantile regression 
 
In this section I present the results for the econometric model outlined in section 3 to 
investigate whether the relationship between hourly wage and individual characteristics differ 
between temporary and permanent workers along the different quantiles of the whole wage 
distribution. According to the descriptive statistics presented in table 1-3, the discrepancy 
between the permanent and temporary log wage could be in part derived from differences in 
permanent’s and temporary’s labour market characteristics as for example age, education, 
occupation and industry. Thus in table 4 I further investigate the wage gap evolution between 
permanent and temporary workers throughout the wage distribution and I present the quantile 
regression respectively for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantile, controlling for individual 
and firms characteristics. Due to limited number of temporary in my sample, I believe that the 
comparison could be flawed at the bottom or at the top of the wage distribution. 
Furthermore the coefficient of contractual type dummy may be considered as a measure of the 
impact of temporary status on the wage profile for each worker, a sort of raw index of labour 
market discrimination against temporary workers. My results are in favour of the “sticky floor” 
hypothesis for atypical workers, in the sense that the wage gap is wider at the bottom of the 
distribution, as evidenced in table 4.  
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At the bottom of the distribution (10th percentile), the gap is about 20,6% and it is statistically 
significant at the 1%. Then the temporary-permanent wage differentials is lower at the 25th and 
50th percentile, around 13,3% and 11,3% and always statistically significant at the 1%. A 
further reduction is present at the 75th percentile where the gap is now slightly more than 6% 
and significant at the conventional level. Finally the data shows a marked reduction in the 
wage differentials at the upper tail of distribution (90th percentile) where the sign is reverse and 
the coefficient is now positive, around 3,3% but not statistically significant. These results 
reject the hypothesis of “glass ceiling” which prevents temporary from reaching high wages, 
suggesting that the link between flexibility and wage gap could be a problem for weaker 
workers at the bottom of the distribution. 
Figure 2 reports the coefficient estimates and their 95 per cent confidence intervals for the 
temporary dummy, comparing quantile regression and OLS models by gender.21 Comparing 
the estimates from quantile and OLS regression, it notes that for both females and males the 
OLS coefficient tends to underestimate the wage penalty for temporary workers until the 60th  
percentile. In particular the difference between OLS and quantile estimates appear more wider 
at the bottom and top ends of the conditional wage distribution both for male and female 
workers.     
To confirm this feature and to shed further light on the nature of wage gap, I look at the effect 
of explanatory variables on log hourly wage across the whole distribution, to find a theoretical 
explanation to the glass floor hypothesis. As I carry out different quantile regression on the 
combined temporary and permanent dataset, the temp  dummy coefficient can be simply 
interpreted as a measure of the extent to which wage gap between the two groups of workers 
remains unexplained at each quantiles after controlling for individual and job characteristics. 
The effect of age is not clear cut across various quantiles, with a positive value around 1% at 
the 25th percentile and statistically significant at 10% and the opposite sign at the 75th 
percentiles, while for other percentiles the coefficient is not statistically significant. Differently 
the impact of experience is increasing and slightly positive in column 1-4, but stronger at the 
top of the distribution and characterized by decreasing marginal rate of return, given the 
negative sign on experience squared. A similar but less marked picture is for tenure. 
Looking at the education and taking the elementary or none as base category, in column (1) I 
observe a positive and statistically significant for all four coefficient, with a larger value for 
university degree, around 23% that in column (5) at the 90th percentiles is more than double, 
                                                 
21 These graph are obtained using Stata and the grqreg module due to Azevedo (2004) that graphs the coefficients 
from quantile regression and the standard errors are calculated via bootstrapping with 50 replications. Further it 
graphs the coefficient and confidence interval from an OLS regression on the same model. For quantile regression 
the estimates are calculated at each 0,01 percentile point, as well as for the confidence intervals. The OLS estimates 
are represented through the horizontal line and specific upper and lower 95% confidence interval in the figure 2.  
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47,7%  and always statistically significant at 1%. A similar but lower trend is for other level of 
education in the different percentiles examined. 
The analysis for macro-regions reveals some interesting patterns: considering the North-East 
as reference category, at the bottom of distribution to stay in the North-West and in the Centre 
has a slightly negative effect on log hourly wage. Differently to live in Southern has a stronger 
negative impact. The estimates for the 25th percentile report a penalty around 3% for the 
North-West and 14% for the South, both statistically significant at 1%. The pattern changes at 
the top of distribution, in particular looking at the 75th percentile the difference between the 
North-West and the South is now narrower, probably because for the high-wage jobs the 
penalty of living in the South is lower. 
In addition, the firm size dummy variables show an increasing wage rate with the number of 
employees that is stronger at the bottom than at the top of wage distribution. For example to be 
employed in a firm with more than 500 employees increases the wage of 24% at the 10th 
percentile and of 19% at the 90th percentile, using always as reference category firm up to 4 
employees. The effects are all statistically significant at the conventional level. Furthermore 
the public firms positively affect the wage in particular at the bottom of distribution, as shown 
in column (1) at 10th percentile, with an effect around 28% and statistically significant. This 
impact tends to be lower at the top of the distribution, as for example in column (5) at the 90th 
percentile (around 19%). A possible explanation is that public sector has a more compressed 
wage distribution and the public sector wage premium could be highest at the lower end of the 
wage distribution and then to decrease monotonically, as found for other countries. 
A reverse pattern is shown whether I look at the manager dummy which effect is instead 
monotonically increasing along the whole distribution with a larger spread from the 10th to the 
90th percentile (18% vs. 27%). At last the gender dummy seem to indicate the presence of a 
constant gap between male and female around 9-10%, always significant and similar in almost 
percentiles estimates.   
To exploit the gender differences, I replicate the model for both male and female and in table 5 
and 6, I report the quantile regression for men and female separately. 
Table 5 shows the estimates for female, exhibiting the same pattern as the above model for all 
sample, but some important dissimilarities between female and male appears, for instance in 
the magnitude of coefficients. As mentioned previously, the temporary status has a lower 
negative impact for female workers. Indeed at the 10th the gap is around 14% and statistically 
significant at 1% and this pattern is confirmed until 50th percentile where the coefficient is -
0.082 (about 8%), so accepting the glass floor hypothesis. But these estimates evidence how 
the penalty for temporary status has also a gender dimension that favours female. Nevertheless 
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at the top of distribution the coefficient is positive and not statistically significant, in line with 
the previous results. 
A further observation is about regional dimension. Here at the bottom of distribution (10th and 
25th) to stay in the Southern has a greater negative impact on wage rate, respectively 33% and 
17%, while the coefficients for other regions is similar to previous table. Finally, as outlined 
above, the public sector strengthened the positive effect for female workers (31% at the bottom 
of distribution), probably due to its more compressed wage structure. 
Table 6 presents the estimates for male workers. First, the gap between temporary and 
permanent is higher, in particular at the bottom of distribution, but the pattern is well-defined 
and reverse only at the 90th percentiles. For example at the 10th percentile the penalty is around 
23% and statistically significant at 1%, ten percentage points of difference with the same 
percentile for female workers. The 75th percentile shows yet a significant penalty for 
temporary workers about 10%, albeit a substantial reduction. Hence the wage differentials are 
wider for male worker and in part present also at the top of distribution. 
As expected to be a manager has a stronger impact than for female workers, in line with the 
literature on female employment segregation that outlined a poor presence of women in high-
level job position. Married status also positively acts on wage rate, around 5-6% on the whole 
distribution while the rate of return of experience is statistically significant only in the upper 
tail of distribution, with a return around 1%. The pattern for education, firm size and region of 
residence is similar to previous estimates. 
 
  
4.2) Machado-Mata decomposition and wage gap: coefficient or characteristics effect? 
 
Table 9 presents the results from decomposing the earning gap between temporary and 
permanent workers for selected percentile, using the Melly (2006) estimator applied to quantile 
regression. Here the interest is the decomposition of wage gap in an endowment and 
coefficients effect, to account for the presence of discrimination in the Italian labour market, 
looking before to all sample and then replicated for male and female separately. 
The Machado-Mata decomposition using the quantile regression and the Melly (2006) 
estimator shows that the part due to difference in characteristics and the part due to the 
coefficient effect vary throughout different percentile. Looking at the column (1) of table 7, for 
the 10th and 20th percentile, the raw difference between permanent and temporary is high, 
around 30% but the hypothesis of glass floor for temporary seem to be confirmed, as 
evidenced by the negative coefficients effect that accounts for about half of total raw 
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differences. Although this evidence, still significant appears the difference in labour market 
characteristics, constant in all selected percentile (around -0.160). As evidenced in previous 
estimates, the upper tail of distribution (from 60th percentile) shows a monotonically reduction 
of the coefficients effect, that combines with the endowments effect clearly suggests a 
progressive reduction of discrimination for temporary in the high-wage job.      
Column (2) and (3) of table 9 report some interesting feature. For example, the raw differential 
is higher for female at the lower percentile, but this pattern is reversed approximately at the 
40th percentile and subsequently the raw wage gap is higher for male, in particular at the upper 
tail of distribution, from 60th percentile. Furthermore the component due to differences in 
return (coefficients effect) is continuously decreasing in absolute term for female, while the 
pattern is not clear cut for male, especially in the highest percentile. 
At the same way the component due to relative endowment tends to be monotonically 
increasing for female from the 30th percentile, slightly different from the constant trend in male 
column. For the 80th and 90th percentile of women distribution, essentially the entire gap is 
accounted by differences in endowments effect between temporary and permanent, as the 
coefficient effect is near to zero. 
Column (4)-(6) repeat the same decomposition techniques but controlling for sample selection, 
as described in the section about econometric model. The table 9 show that the introduction of 
polynomials in inverse Mill’s ratio reduces the proportion of wage penalty explained by the 
coefficient effect without modifying the main findings.  
Thus the general conclusion does not change whichever model used (with or without sample 
selection term) and supports the proposition that temporary workers are more discriminated at 
the bottom of the wage distribution and as we move up across quantiles, this effect reduces, in 
particular for female whose coefficient effect is near zero (or sometimes over) at the top of 
distribution.     
The utility of the results derived from using quantile regression rather than OLS is that they 
reveal a more complete picture of wage differential between permanent and fixed-term 
workers and the pay structure of labour market. 
 
 
4.2.1) Decomposition of the wage gap by individual and job characteristics 
 
Wage gap may vary across educational levels and hence I decompose the wage differential 
between temporary and permanent workers separately for three ranges of schooling: 
elementary and middle school, professional and high school and finally university or post 
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graduate degree. Thus figure 3 reports the Machado-Mata decomposition (coefficient effect) 
separately for the three range of education. The other regressors and the number of replications 
are the same as in the previous section. 
Figure 3a provides the information for university degree. Quantile distribution decomposition 
shows how the price differential declines as I move up the wage distribution . In particular the 
wage penalty for temporary is higher for low-wage job at extreme lower quantiles, probably 
reflecting the port of entry nature of fixed-term employment, used as screening and training 
instrument. So at the bottom of distribution, the discrimination effect is more significative, 
then the price differential reduces at the top of distribution, with a confidence interval that 
includes zero. 
A similar picture is confirmed in the figure 3b, which illustrates the coefficient effect for the 
high and professional school level. The price differential tends to decrease monotonically 
moving up along the wage distribution. Quite surprisingly at the extreme higher quantiles I 
observe a sort of wage premium for temporary workers in this educational group, more defined 
that in university degree. Figure 3c reports the coefficient effect for lower (middle and 
elementary school) educational group, showing a flat line around zero for almost all quantiles. 
So the possible wage gap between temporary and permanent for this schooling range seem to 
be better explained by the characteristics effect, while the figure evidences the absence of a 
significant discrimination effect. 
Concerning the change in the contribution of schooling level to the quantiles of wage equation, 
the results suggest that educational choices have a different impact on individual wage profile 
and represent a source of overall wage dispersion in Italy 
Then figure 4 shows the counterfactual quantile decomposition using Melly’s approach for the 
young workers (16-35 years) and captures the heterogeneity in temporary wage penalty along 
the different quantiles. The characteristics effect seem to be stable over the whole distribution, 
while the estimated negative coefficients effect varies strongly with different quantiles, 
showing a monotonic reduction as I go from the lowest to the highest quantiles. The pattern 
confirms the findings for the high schooling level workers.  
The sticky floor effect for fixed-term jobs at the bottom of the wage distribution indicates a 
sort of discrimination for temporary workers, which in the low-wage works has been exploited 
by the employers to reduce labour cost and to a screening device. Moving on the wage 
distribution the earning penalty seems to disappear and in particular at the top of distribution 
the temporary status is associated with a positive coefficient effect, probably due to the 
taxation model applied in the Italian labour market. 
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Figure 5 and 6 report the same decomposition techniques for the North and the Centre-South 
separately. Therefore looking at the North the total differential is mainly defined by the 
coefficients effect which indicate a stronger wage inequality than in the South with an higher 
discrimination at the bottom of distribution that tends to reduce until 20th quantile. Quite 
differently if I look at the top end of the earning distribution the coefficients effect revenges its 
sign, assuming positive value. Less volatile is the picture that come from figure 6 for the South, 
where from the 50th quantile the negative characteristics effect tends to increase so 
counterbalancing the reduction in discrimination effect for the extreme higher quantiles.  
The same empirical exercise is applied to private and public sector (see figure 7-8), revealing a 
similar picture with a wider variation in earnings differentials in public than private sector. 
This result confirms recent studies that report an increase of wage inequality in the Italian 
public sector.        
Finally, the wage gap can be decomposed as usual into the discriminatory (coefficients) and 
non-discriminatory (rewards) components. In the case of differences between fixed-term and 
permanent wage schedules in Italy, I show that this approach evidences not only different 
absolute wage differentials according to the location of the worker in the distribution of wages, 
but also that the contributes of coefficients effect between the two groups modifies along such 
location. Moreover the pattern of unequal pay gaps in term both of their absolute size and of 
discrimination effect tends to reduce over the wage scale. 
 
 
4.3) Selectivity bias in quantile regression 
 
The single wage equation with a dummy variable for contract status must be interpreted with 
attention because it rely on the strong assumption that the wage determination process is the 
same for both temporary and permanent workers. This restriction may be violated whether the 
returns to individual characteristics, as education or job experience, are affected by the contract 
status, so conducting to a misspecification of the model. 
In order to control for, I correct my wage equation for the selectivity bias, applying a variant of 
the two-step methods proposed by Buchinsky (2001) in the quantile regression framework. 
Thus I estimate the probability of being a temporary worker conditionally on the other 
covariates and instrument to describe the selection process and to identify the Mills ratio series 
necessary as correction term in the quantile wage equation. The estimation is performed by a 
probit model which relies on the normality assumption for the residuals and distinguishs by 
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region (North vs. Centre-South).22 The estimation procedure has also controlled for a gender 
dimension of selection process in temporary employment.  
In the second step, quantile regressions for log hourly wage are estimated, including the 
inverse Mill’s ratio polynomials, based on the probit model results.23 The selectivity correction 
terms are not significant with some exception for male workers, in particular at the 25th, 75th 
and 90th quantiles of the conditional earnings distribution, on the linear λ  coefficient. The 
negative and significant impact of selection term shows that temporary workers earn less than 
would be expected for their observable characteristics and the phenomenon is observed 
throughout whole distribution. One possible explanation for such result is that fixed-term 
workers may be reluctant to bargain aggressively, either due to the temporary nature of their 
job positions or to the lack of information about what permanent workers with similar 
observable characteristics are paid.  
Table 7 and 8 report the same QR wage equation but controlling for selectivity bias. As a 
comparison, the selectivity issue has not modified the estimates for female workers, 
evidencing only a slightly reduction of sticky floor effect for the lower quantile, as well as a 
not significant wage premium at the top end of distribution. Quite different is the picture that 
appears for male. Indeed the selection correction term has reduced the wage penalty associated 
with temporary status across the whole earning distribution, so suggesting that contract status 
is a more important issue for male workers without modifying the general pattern as outlined 
in previous sub-section.    
 
 
4.4) The endogeneity of temporary: the IV quantile regression estimates 
 
It is anticipated that the IVQR analysis correcting for endogenous selection will have slightly 
different results based on the heterogeneous effect of the temporary work treatment across the 
entire population. Moreover, the robustness of the model should also give an indication 
whether the IV assumptions and the validity of the instrument hold in predicting wage gaps for 
fixed-term workers. 
                                                 
22 In the traditional Buchinsky model (1998) the first step was performed using a semi-parametric regression which 
make no assumptions about the distribution of the residuals.  
23 The inverse Mill’s ratio polynomials are of second order, 2λλ +  and are applied separately for male and 
female. Then the first step probit specification already distinguishes by region of residence, respectively North and 
Centre-South, to take into account the duality of Italian labour market and the different probability to have a fixed-
term contract. 
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Table 9 reports the 2LAD and QTE estimates for both female and male workers., using as 
instrument the on the job searching dummy variable.24 Whether I focus on the 2LAD results 
for the contract type indicator, I detect that the wage differentials between fixed-term and 
permanent workers is lower than in standard QR, mainly at the bottom of wage profile.  
In addition, the pattern of differences with the standard model seems to suggest that QR 
models are biased upwards due to endogenous self-selection in temporary contracts for the 
low-wage job, while no significant differences are found at the top of distribution. The two 
stage LAD estimates for male workers are lower than the QR counterpart up to the conditional 
median regression, while the results show a greater wage penalty (than the standard QR) in the 
upper tail of earnings profile. This suggests the possible presence of a glass ceiling effect for 
male temporary workers, given  that the wage penalty seem to widen for 75th  and 90th  quantile. 
However it should be noted that the pattern of the 2LAD estimates is more compressed than 
the standard QR model, with a similar negative coefficient between the 10th and the 90th  
quantile for male. But the loss of precision is big enough to render some coefficients not 
significant in the case of women and thus emphasizing that the 2LAD model fails to represent 
accurately the pattern of differences in temporary wage penalty encountered along the 
distribution. Therefore the precision of these estimates is not very high so the implications we 
are about to discuss do not have a conclusive nature.   
For this reason, I focus on the Quantile Treatment Effect (QTE) results that, correcting for the 
endogeneity, allows to capture the heterogeneous impact of temporary contract throughout the 
whole distribution. The most remarkable aspect of these findings is how large the relative gap 
is, accounting for the endogenous selection in temporary contract and using as instrument the 
on the job searching dummy variable. In table 9, I report for both female and male sample two 
different IVQR specifications, one controlling only for individuals characteristics and one for 
both individuals and occupational variable.  
At a first look, comparing the estimates from QTE with those from standard QR, it appears 
that standard quantile regression for female tends mainly to underestimate the wage penalty for 
female temporary workers across the entire earnings distribution. Differently, the QTE 
estimates at the bottom of distribution (10th quantile) are lower than the QR counterparts for 
male workers, while they are higher as I move up along the wage profile. In particular the 
estimated coefficient is -0.218 at the 10th quantile (vs. -0.233 for QR), therefore controlling for 
                                                 
24 As above mentioned in a previous section, empirical studies has widely focused on the weakness of instrument to 
correct the endogenous self-selection in the wage differentials analysis. In practice, I am aware that the validity of 
the on the job searching dummy as instrument cannot be tested. In order to apply a robustness check, I run different 
specification to test the validity of my results. In particular I use the days for sick as further instrument and the 
results do not change. To exploit peculiar feature of QTE estimator I cannot use the lagged share of temporary 
employment by region, skills and sector to control for a demand side factor. Thus, following Picchio (2006) I report 
the results for on the job searching dummy variable in a IVQR framework. 
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the endogeneity of the fixed-term dummy variable reduces the wage penalty for low-wage job. 
Negative and significant signs are reported for man at almost all quantile of the wage 
distribution. In practice the wage penalty for male temporary workers is greater in IVQR than 
in standard QR at the top of distribution (for instance at the 75th  quantile -0.151 vs. -0.102). 
Furthermore I test for the difference between the QR and QTE coefficients and mainly for 
women, I’m able to reject the equality between the two model. However, as argued by Autor et 
al. (2006) for the U.S. labour market, the results show a polarization in the Italian labour 
market, with higher wage inequality in the lower tail of wage profile and the importance to 
look not only to conditional mean but across the whole earnings distribution in order to better 
account for the effect of flexible contracts in shaping wage inequality pattern. In this sense 
QTE approach allows to describe the heterogeneous impact of temporary contract and showing 
wider differences along all quantiles than standard QR not accounting for the endogeneity 
issue.  
Moreover if I look at the QTE estimates without controlling for job-related characteristics, I 
find interesting gender differences on the evolution of the wage penalty along the distributions. 
In particular the female QTE estimates shows how the wage gap between temporary and 
permanent workers reduces controlling for occupational variable. It could be argued, as 
discussed in the gender wage gap literature, that these findings are in favour of the sticky doors 
hypothesis. This means that the job-related characteristics may account for a wide share of 
overall wage penalty, indicating how not controlling for the occupational variables could 
overestimate the real wage gap for female fixed-term workers. Differently the inclusion of 
occupational variables does not modify so much the temporary coefficient for male workers, 
who show  significant and negative coefficients in both specifications until the 90th quantile. 
Finally these results can be compared to estimates from the international literature on wage 
differentials between temporary and stable workers in order to examine how the wage gap 
varies after controlling for occupational characteristics. For instance, Graaf-Zijl (2005) found 
that in Netherlands the raw wage gap is 23 percent and exploiting matching technique, they 
explain 77 percent of the wage gap with controls for firms size, industry, occupational and 
wage bargaining information. De La Rica (2004) for Spanish labour market provided a 
decomposition for the raw wage gap and showed how 42 percent of the gap is due to firm 
segregation, 9 percent to occupational segregation and 57 percent due to individual 
characteristics. Differently, Davia and Hernanz (2004) always for Spain found that the wage 
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differentials between temporary and permanent workers are mainly explained by differences in 
personal and job characteristics, while differences in rewards are not significant.25 
Thus the main finding in IVQR estimates is that the wage penalty is higher than the one 
deriving from the standard QR model and therefore if I do not take into account the 
endogeneity of contract type, I underestimate the wage gap between temporary and permanent 
workers. Moreover, this result may be interpreted as a positive correlation between the 
unobservable individual characteristics (like ability) and the probability of holding a fixed-
term work, i.e. more able workers choose temporary jobs and lower wages, anticipating that 
the contract will be renewed with higher wage. In addition, empirical evidence confirms the 
sticky floor hypothesis, with a wider wage gap at the bottom of distribution, in particular for 
male workers and the sticky doors effect for women, i.e. controlling for occupational variable 
is able to explain a large share of the wage penalty.  
Furthermore, whether I do not control for sample selection bias,26 the wage equation estimates 
may be inconsistent even if I have corrected for the endogenous selection. Thus I carry out the 
sample selection correction, estimating firstly the latent index model that indicates the 
participation decision throough a standard probit model. Then I derive a specific Mills’ ratio as 
suggested by Heckman (1979) and Buchinsky (1998). As excluded instruments in this stage I 
use the presence of children. The probit selection equation includes traditional variables that 
may act on the participation in the labour market. Further having a children does not directly 
modify the wage, i.e. it has been argued that there is no correlation between unobservable 
variables and the probability to have a children.  
Moreover, I use the estimated Mills’ ratio as the argument in the power series expansion to 
control for sample selection bias in the QR wage equation controlling for the endogeneity of 
temporary contract. The results indicate that the correction term are not statistically significant 
and different from zero (looking at t-statistics for the power series expansion), thus the sample 
selection bias is not an issue, in line with the literature. I therefore decide not to report the 
estimates controlling for sample selection bias.    
Finally, table 10 summarizes the results on the wage penalty, looking at the coefficient for 
temporary contract variable. First of all, as robustness check, I perform a second specification 
of the self-selection model where the identification is obtained only through the non-linearity 
of the Mills’ ratio, without any excluded instrument in the first stage. The results are in line 
                                                 
25 Further their results indicated that the employment structure of the labour market has played an important role in 
explaining the wage differentials between temporary and permanent workers, but the presence of a significant 
selection bias term in the decomposition analysis confirms that indefinite and fixed-term jobs may be quite different.   
26 As above mentioned, the sample selection bias may occur because the sample of observed wages is not randomly 
selected from the population and thus the decision to participate may be correlated with the error term of the wage 
equation, making the estimates inconsistent.  
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with QR estimates and for male workers more similar to QTE approach. In practice, the 
difference between the QTE estimator and the variant of traditional endogenous dummy 
variable model may be interpreted as a signal of the failure of self-selection model to capture 
the heterogeneous impact of temporary contract across the whole distribution, once controlled 
for the endogeniety. However all three model confirms the presence of a sticky floor effect in 
the Italian labour market, i.e. the wage penalty for fixed-term works widens at the bottom of 
distribution. 
 
 
5) Conclusion 
 
In this work I investigate the existence of wage differentials between temporary and permanent 
workers in Italy using the 2006 wave of SHIW. In addition, I examine how the wage gap 
differs along the wage distribution applying a quantile regression model, in the line of several 
and recent studies for other European countries. Secondly I extend the traditional Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition to disentangle the endowments and coefficients effects in the 
explanation of wage differentials and to evaluate the presence of discrimination in the rate of 
return for atypical contracts. In this sense the Machado-Mata decomposition has been 
performed, using Melly (2006) approach, to provide new insights into the nature and the 
sources of wage gap in the Italian labour market. 
The unconditional wage gap between temporary and permanent is wider at the bottom of the 
distribution (around 30%) and then tends to decrease monotonically in the top of distribution. 
In particular the contractual status shows a gap that is far from being constant within the wage 
distribution. The quantile regression presents the same pattern, confirming the sticky floor 
hypothesis, with well defined wage differentials for the low percentile of the distribution. 
Furthermore the gender analysis reports a stronger gap for male worker and a higher spread 
between the upper and the lower tail of the wage distribution. 
Moreover my decomposition throughout the whole wage distribution detects the presence of a 
wide coefficients effect at the bottom of the distribution which can be interpreted as a sort of 
discrimination in low-wage jobs for fixed-term workers. For female, after the 30th percentile, 
the coefficients effects is monotonically decreasing and so in the upper tail of distribution the 
difference in earnings appear to be the consequence of different labour market characteristics. 
Quite different is for male, where the rate of return effect seems to be present also at the top of 
distribution. In addition, the pattern of unequal gaps between temporary and permanent wages 
is such that both their absolute size and the portion that can be attributed to differences in 
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reward (discrimination) reduces over the pay scale. This pattern could provide an explanation 
to the lack of a robust relationship between OLS measures of wage gap and the perceived 
wage discrimination. 
Wage gap may vary across educational levels or by sector and hence I replicate the Machado-
Mata decomposition on different sub-sample to investigate whether the discrimination effect is 
distributed equally between categories or whether it regards only some disadvantaged groups. 
The analysis for schooling range confirms that for high-skilled workers the coefficient effect is 
negative and suggests the presence of a wide wage penalty that tends to reduce as we move 
along the distribution and at the top of earnings profile we observe also a revenge in sign with 
a positive (or near to zero) discrimination effect for fixed-term workers. Similar results appear 
whether I compare public and private sector. 
As suggested in literature I also control for possible source of misspecification in wage 
equation and tries to correct for the self-selection (or endogeneity) in temporary contract and 
for sample selection, applying firstly a variant of Buchinsky methods (2001) and then the IV 
estimates, comparing different approach. The results are not completely clear-cut but seem to 
confirm the presence of a sticky-floor effects and to indicate that the endogeneity bias is 
significant, mainly at the bottom of the wage distribution. 
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Tab.1: Distribution of permanent and temporary work by personal and job 
characteristics in Italy, 2006 
 All sample Permanent Temporary 
    
Men  57,4 58,0 53,4 
Women  42,6 42,0 46,6 
Education    
None or elementary 5,1 4,7 8,1 
Middle school 33,5 33,1 36,2 
Professional School 10,2 10,4 9,0 
High school 38,0 38,6 33,9 
University degree 
or more 
12,9 13,0 12,5 
Age    
Up to 30 19,0 15,8 40,4 
31-40  31,3 31,5 30,1 
41-50 30,3 31,9 19,4 
51-65 19,2 20,6 9,9 
Firm size    
Up to 4 11,1 9,7 20,3 
From 5 to 19 22,9 22,0 28,5 
From 20 to 49 15,0 14,9 15,1 
From 50 to 99 9,3 9,7 6,5 
From 100 to 499 9,7 10,2 5,8 
500 or more 10,2 10,7 7,3 
Public sector 21,5 22,3 16,1 
Region    
North-west 29,2 25,3 20,3 
North-east 24,9 30,5 21,7 
Centre 19,2 19,9 14,0 
South 17,6 16,0 28,4 
Islands 8,9 8,0 15,3 
Occupation    
Blue collar 49,4 47,1 64,9 
White collar 42,8 44,5 31,2 
Manager 7,7 8,3 3,7 
Industry    
Agriculture 4,5 3,5 11,6 
Industry and mining 29,0 30,4 19,6 
Building and 
construction 
7,1 6,2 13,0 
Wholesale and 
retail trade 
11,8 11,4 14,5 
Transport and 
communication 
4,6 4,6 4,5 
Credit and 
insurance 
3,2 3,4 1,8 
Business services 3,7 3,8 3,4 
Domestic services 6,0 5,6 9,3 
Public 
adiministration 
29,4 30,5 21,6 
    Note: Shiw, 2006 
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Tab.2: Percentiles of the log hourly wage for temporary and permanent workers 
 Temporary Permanent 
   
Percentiles   
   
10% 1,42 1,76 
25% 1,65 1,95 
50% 1,90 2,14 
75% 2,12 2,37 
90% 2,44 2,66 
0.9-0.1 spread 1,02 0,90 
   
Mean 1,90 2,18 
St. dev. 0,47 0,39 
Obs. 646 4930 
                 Note: Shiw, 2006 
 
 
Fig.1a: Kernel density estimates of the wage distribution for temporary 
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Fig.1b: Kernel density estimates of the wage distribution for permanent 
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Tab.4: Quantile regression for wage gap between temporary and permanent workers 
 Quantile 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Temporary -0.207*** 
(-6.16) 
-0.133*** 
(-10.17) 
-0.113*** 
(-10.92) 
-0.064*** 
(-4.72) 
0.033 
(1.22) 
Age 0.017 
(2.09)*** 
0.010** 
(2.04) 
-0.003 
(-0.83) 
-0.014** 
(-2.41) 
-0.007 
(-0.89) 
Age^2 0.000 
(-1.69)* 
0.000 
(-1.49) 
0.000* 
(1.84) 
0.000*** 
(3.14) 
0.000* 
(1.89) 
Experience 0.009** 
(2.64) 
0.006*** 
(2.64) 
0.013*** 
(4.51) 
0.013*** 
(3.67) 
0.011** 
(2.53) 
Experience^2 0.000** 
(-2.59)** 
-0.001** 
(-2.44) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.15) 
0.001*** 
(-4.33) 
0.000*** 
(-3.49) 
Tenure 0.006*** 
(2.66) 
0.007*** 
(6.44) 
0.004** 
(2.47) 
0.006*** 
(3.36) 
0.001 
(0.61) 
Tenure^2 -0.001 
(-1.45) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.79) 
0.000 
(-0.91) 
0.000 
(-1.55) 
0.000 
(1.11) 
Education      
University or more 0.220*** 
(5.72) 
0.269*** 
(8.98) 
0.365*** 
(15.18) 
0.434*** 
(18.53) 
0.477*** 
(9.82) 
High school 0.115*** 
(3.49) 
0.115*** 
(4.21) 
0.164*** 
(10.26) 
0.182*** 
(9.69) 
0.203*** 
(7.05) 
Professional school 0.092** 
(2.46) 
0.097*** 
(4.08) 
0.103*** 
(5.88) 
0.141*** 
(6.62) 
0.190*** 
(4.59) 
Middle school 0.045 
(1.49) 
0.056** 
(2.49) 
0.064*** 
(4.40) 
0.069*** 
(3.34) 
0.091*** 
(3.30) 
Region      
North-West -0.041*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.029*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.022*** 
(-3.44) 
-0.029* 
(-1.66) 
-0.032** 
(-2.15) 
Center -0.053*** 
(-3.25) 
-0.024** 
(-2.04) 
-0.013 
(-1.30) 
-0.013 
(-0.86) 
-0.01 
(-0.77) 
South -0.232*** 
(-10.75) 
-0.142*** 
(-15.10) 
-0.089*** 
(-8.23) 
-0.040** 
(-1.98) 
-0.043* 
(-1.79) 
Islands -0.165*** 
(-7.97) 
-0.096*** 
(-4.65) 
-0.061*** 
(-3.34) 
-0.053*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.066*** 
(-3.13) 
Firm dimension      
From 5 to 19 0.159*** 
(5.89) 
0.093*** 
(4.38) 
0.089*** 
(5.30) 
0.070*** 
(3.70) 
0.061* 
(1.90) 
From 20 to 49 0.166*** 
(4.55) 
0.108*** 
(4.95) 
0.106*** 
(6.71) 
0.096*** 
(4.26) 
0.112*** 
(3.27) 
From 50 to 99 0.224*** 
(6.49) 
0.137*** 
(6.43) 
0.120*** 
(6.42) 
0.095*** 
(3.84) 
0.083** 
(2.29) 
From 100 to 499 0.205*** 
(6.82) 
0.146*** 
(7.68) 
0.167*** 
(8.50) 
0.169*** 
(7.09) 
0.170*** 
(4.85) 
Over 500 0.244*** 
(7.36) 
0.189*** 
(10.77) 
0.185*** 
(9.01) 
0.183*** 
(6.28) 
0.192*** 
(5.56) 
Occupation      
White collars 0.100*** 
(5.92) 
0.103*** 
(7.42) 
0.097*** 
(9.21) 
0.101*** 
(9.64) 
0.122*** 
(6.90) 
Public employees 0.278*** 
(6.13) 
0.181*** 
(7.06) 
0.198*** 
(6.99) 
0.206*** 
(6.97) 
0.194*** 
(4.87) 
Managers 0.183*** 
(7.40) 
0.190*** 
(8.33) 
0.207*** 
(10.75) 
0.233*** 
(8.96) 
0.273*** 
(10.34) 
Female -0.109*** 
(-7.80) 
-0.099*** 
(-11.94) 
-0.092*** 
(-10.03) 
-0.091*** 
(-8.38) 
-0.076*** 
(-3.69) 
Married 0.031 
(1.52) 
0.031*** 
(2.94) 
0.039*** 
(4.07) 
0.036*** 
(2.91) 
0.061*** 
(2.75) 
Head of Household 
 
Industry dummies 
0.017 
(1.04) 
Yes 
0.013 
(1.29) 
Yes 
0.023*** 
(2.69) 
Yes 
0.029** 
(2.54) 
Yes 
0.027 
(1.49) 
Yes 
               Note: the table reports coefficient estimates of different quantile regression and the test t are reported in parentesis. 
*** Significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5% and * significant at the 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 35
Tab.5: Quantile regression for wage gap between temporary and permanent workers, 
female 
 Quantile 
 10th 25th 50° 75th 90th 
Temporary -0.145*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.099*** 
(-3.78) 
-0.082*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.044 
(-1.48) 
0.043 
(0.57) 
Age 0.023 
(1.61) 
0.004 
(0.40) 
-0.004 
(-0.55) 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
0.006 
(0.55) 
Age^2 0.000 
(-1.30) 
0.000 
(-0.12) 
0.000 
(1.19) 
0.000 
(0.66) 
0.000 
(0.13) 
Experience 0.003 
(0.78) 
0.006 
(1.44) 
0.011*** 
(2.98) 
0.011*** 
(3.19) 
0.012 
(1.50) 
Experience^2 0.000 
(-0.48) 
0.000 
(-1.26) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.26) 
0.000*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.001 
(-1.65) 
Tenure 0.008** 
(2.01) 
0.009*** 
(3.71) 
0.004** 
(2.35) 
0.006** 
(2.34) 
0.003 
(0.46) 
Tenure^2 -0.001 
(-1.33) 
0.000*** 
(-3.00) 
0.000 
(-0.27) 
0.000 
(-0.61) 
0.000 
(0.40) 
Education      
University or more 0.281*** 
(4.39) 
0.351*** 
(7.39) 
0.405*** 
(9.59) 
0.501*** 
(14.64) 
0.461*** 
(4.47) 
High school 0.135** 
(2.23) 
0.148*** 
(4.04) 
0.192*** 
(5.96) 
0.221*** 
(7.86) 
0.215** 
(2.49) 
Professional school 0.086 
(1.46) 
0.094** 
(2.26) 
0.123*** 
(3.50) 
0.146*** 
(4.93) 
0.131 
(1.55) 
Middle school 0.045 
(0.81) 
0.088*** 
(2.69) 
0.092*** 
(3.20) 
0.110*** 
(4.74) 
0.114 
(1.27) 
North-West -0.039 
(-1.56) 
-0.029* 
(-1.69) 
-0.026* 
(-1.68) 
-0.041** 
(-2.35) 
-0.080* 
(-1.79) 
Center -0.033 
(-0.74) 
-0.016 
(-0.86) 
-0.006 
(-0.33) 
0.016 
(0.78) 
-0.024 
(-0.58) 
South -0.306*** 
(-5.05) 
-0.171*** 
(-8.78) 
-0.087*** 
(-4.44) 
-0.020 
(-0.70) 
-0.038 
(-0.78) 
Islands -0.127** 
(-2.13) 
-0.049 
(-1.22) 
-0.044* 
(-1.93) 
-0.054** 
(-2.16) 
-0.129* 
(-1.92) 
Firm dimension      
From 5 to 19 0.188*** 
(4.04) 
0.141*** 
(4.39) 
0.102*** 
(4.46) 
0.081*** 
(3.02) 
0.013 
(0.34) 
From 20 to 49 0.165*** 
(2.76) 
0.124*** 
(4.47) 
0.095*** 
(4.32) 
0.055** 
(2.29) 
0.063 
(1.31) 
From 50 to 99 0.250*** 
(5.19) 
0.181*** 
(6.43) 
0.151*** 
(5.76) 
0.142*** 
(6.11) 
0.194*** 
(3.51) 
From 100 to 499 0.243*** 
(4.30) 
0.169*** 
(5.68) 
0.160*** 
(7.58) 
0.144*** 
(4.36) 
0.148*** 
(3.04) 
Over 500 0.234*** 
(4.48) 
0.181*** 
(4.30) 
0.167*** 
(4.23) 
0.154*** 
(4.13) 
0.102 
(1.47) 
Occupation      
White collars 0.101*** 
(4.06) 
0.113*** 
(5.41) 
0.103*** 
(5.53) 
0.115*** 
(7.66) 
0.124*** 
(3.88) 
Public employees 0.314*** 
(4.15) 
0.220*** 
(6.40) 
0.210*** 
(7.99) 
0.231*** 
(4.70) 
0.161*** 
(3.24) 
Managers 0.150*** 
(3.26) 
0.127*** 
(3.15) 
0.183*** 
(8.80) 
0.221*** 
(6.87) 
0.184*** 
(3.62) 
Married 0.025 
(0.81) 
0.011 
(0.57) 
0.002 
(0.13) 
-0.007 
(-0.36) 
-0.031 
(-0.91) 
Head of Household 0.019 
(0.82) 
0.007 
(0.38) 
0.006 
(0.37) 
-0.003 
(-0.20) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       Note: the table reports coefficient estimates of diffent quantile regression and the test t are reported in parentesis. 
*** Significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5% and * significant at the 10%.  
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Tab.6: Quantile regression for wage gap between temporary and permanent workers, 
male 
 Quantile 
 10th 25th 50° 75th 90th 
Temporary -0.233*** 
(-4.73) 
-0.145*** 
(-6.04) 
-0.122*** 
(-5.11) 
-0.102*** 
(-4.45) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
Age 0.017** 
(2.45) 
0.013* 
(1.72) 
-0.008 
(-1.08) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.00) 
-0.023** 
(-2.55) 
Age^2 -0.001** 
(-2.01) 
-0.001 
(-1.35) 
0.000 
(1.36) 
0.000*** 
(3.59) 
0.000*** 
(3.18) 
Experience 0.004 
(0.80) 
0.006 
(1.61) 
0.013*** 
(4.16) 
0.015*** 
(3.48) 
0.016*** 
(3.87) 
Experience^2 0.000 
(-1.36) 
-0.001* 
(-1.95) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.90) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.26) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.81) 
Tenure 0.007*** 
(2.75) 
0.007*** 
(5.38) 
0.005*** 
(3.20) 
0.004 
(1.47) 
0.002 
(0.57) 
Tenure^2 0.000** 
(-2.02) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.30) 
0.000** 
(-2.03) 
0.000 
(-0.64) 
0.000 
(0.52) 
Education      
University or more 0.179*** 
(3.75) 
0.225*** 
(4.83) 
0.317*** 
(10.79) 
0.319*** 
(6.76) 
0.360*** 
(5.59) 
High school 0.095*** 
(2.63) 
0.098*** 
(3.15) 
0.134*** 
(4.86) 
0.132*** 
(4.79) 
0.117** 
(2.13) 
Professional school 0.087** 
(2.18) 
0.110*** 
(2.86) 
0.099*** 
(3.85) 
0.123*** 
(3.57) 
0.139** 
(2.28) 
Middle school 0.046 
(1.34) 
0.057** 
(2.18) 
0.055*** 
(2.74) 
0.043* 
(1.75) 
0.025 
(0.52) 
North-West -0.068*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.022 
(-1.12) 
-0.010 
(-0.71) 
-0.012 
(-0.63) 
-0.047** 
(-2.06) 
Center -0.054** 
(-2.34) 
-0.025** 
(-2.20) 
-0.016 
(-1.22) 
-0.013 
(-0.73) 
-0.013 
(-0.41) 
South -0.218*** 
(-7.70) 
-0.118*** 
(-7.15) 
-0.075*** 
(-3.80) 
-0.060** 
(-2.15) 
-0.070** 
(-2.25) 
Islands -0.190*** 
(-5.97) 
-0.114*** 
(-4.64) 
-0.068*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.049 
(-1.39) 
-0.076* 
(-1.82) 
Firm dimension      
From 5 to 19 0.099* 
(1.97) 
0.047 
(1.48) 
0.067*** 
(4.57) 
0.053** 
(2.43) 
0.025 
(0.50) 
From 20 to 49 0.117** 
(2.29) 
0.084*** 
(2.75) 
0.107*** 
(6.54) 
0.095*** 
(4.25) 
0.084* 
(1.84) 
From 50 to 99 0.152*** 
(2.78) 
0.090*** 
(3.98) 
0.080*** 
(4.79) 
0.046 
(1.63) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
From 100 to 499 0.154*** 
(3.13) 
0.112*** 
(2.92) 
0.165*** 
(8.15) 
0.173*** 
(6.25) 
0.154*** 
(3.25) 
Over 500 0.202*** 
(3.43) 
0.155*** 
(5.78) 
0.186*** 
(7.95) 
0.190*** 
(6.06) 
0.149*** 
(3.05) 
Occupation      
White collars 0.112*** 
(5.50) 
0.116*** 
(6.42) 
0.111*** 
(6.45) 
0.111*** 
(5.52) 
0.147*** 
(6.68) 
Public employees 0.205*** 
(3.21) 
0.140*** 
(3.09) 
0.161*** 
(6.02) 
0.179*** 
(5.55) 
0.174*** 
(2.98) 
Managers 0.224*** 
(10.23) 
0.234*** 
(9.36) 
0.245*** 
(11.25) 
0.279*** 
(7.86) 
0.343*** 
(8.21) 
Married 0.057*** 
(2.93) 
0.040*** 
(3.39) 
0.065*** 
(4.02) 
0.064** 
(2.56) 
0.063** 
(2.22) 
Head of Household 0.018 
(0.77) 
0.016 
(1.52) 
0.029** 
(2.19) 
0.045*** 
(4.57) 
0.040 
(1.31) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Note: the table reports coefficient estimates of diffent quantile regression and the test t are reported in parentesis. 
*** Significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5% and * significant at the 10%.   
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Tab. 7: Quantile wage regression with selectivity correction, female 
 Quantile 
 10th 25th 50° 75th 90th 
Temporary -0.129** 
(-2.16) 
-0.091*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.093*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.037 
(-1.47) 
0.058 
(0.98) 
Age 0.026 
(1.50) 
0.005 
(0.44) 
-0.005 
(-0.76) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
0.003 
(0.23) 
Age^2 0.000 
(-1.32) 
0.000 
(-0.17) 
0.000 
(1.51) 
0.000 
(0.43) 
0.000 
(0.35) 
Experience 0.002 
(0.38) 
0.010** 
(2.24) 
0.014*** 
(4.35) 
0.011** 
(2.56) 
0.015*** 
(2.76) 
Experience^2 0.000 
(-0.19) 
0.000* 
(-1.93) 
0.000*** 
(-4.64) 
0.000** 
(-2.81) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.18) 
Tenure 0.008* 
(1.91) 
0.007** 
(2.30) 
0.003 
(1.22) 
0.003 
(1.27) 
0.003 
(0.54) 
Tenure^2 0.000 
(-1.27) 
-0.001* 
(-1.88) 
0.000 
(0.24) 
0.000 
(0.06) 
0.000 
(0.36) 
Education      
University or more 0.289*** 
(4.95) 
0.352*** 
(7.54) 
0.407*** 
(11.25) 
0.514*** 
(11.86) 
0.471*** 
(5.63) 
High school 0.127** 
(2.49) 
0.151*** 
(4.19) 
0.185*** 
(7.11) 
0.227*** 
(7.20) 
0.224*** 
(3.77) 
Professional school 0.092 
(1.61) 
0.108*** 
(2.66) 
0.124*** 
(4.48) 
0.151*** 
(4.04) 
0.144** 
(2.18) 
Middle school 0.028 
(0.52) 
0.086*** 
(2.60) 
0.086*** 
(3.65) 
0.106*** 
(4.05) 
0.123** 
(2.38) 
North-West -0.045* 
(-1.72) 
-0.038* 
(-1.95) 
-0.015 
(-1.05) 
-0.032** 
(-2.00) 
-0.075** 
(-2.45) 
Center -0.028 
(-0.86) 
-0.018 
(-0.83) 
0.003 
(0.16) 
0.025 
(0.98) 
-0.030 
(-0.68) 
South -0.329*** 
(-5.65) 
-0.174*** 
(-5.49) 
-0.081*** 
(-3.45) 
-0.013 
(-0.43) 
-0.019 
(0.47) 
Islands -0.138** 
(-2.39) 
-0.044 
(-1.07) 
-0.027 
(-1.19) 
-0.041 
(-1.22) 
-0.146*** 
(-2.75) 
Firm dimension      
From 5 to 19 0.185*** 
(3.48) 
0.142*** 
(5.34) 
0.104*** 
(4.93) 
0.069*** 
(3.20) 
0.019 
(0.47) 
From 20 to 49 0.157** 
(2.19) 
0.113*** 
(3.81) 
0.073*** 
(3.27) 
0.053** 
(2.04) 
0.066 
(1.37) 
From 50 to 99 0.258*** 
(4.85) 
0.186*** 
(5.86) 
0.158*** 
(6.60) 
0.151*** 
(4.06) 
0.189*** 
(3.13) 
From 100 to 499 0.242*** 
(3.95) 
0.152*** 
(4.77) 
0.150*** 
(5.35) 
0.120*** 
(3.22) 
0.164** 
(2.48) 
Over 500 0.232*** 
(5.26) 
0.174*** 
(5.24) 
0.166*** 
(5.10) 
0.146*** 
(4.18) 
0.127** 
(2.07) 
Occupation      
White collars 0.078** 
(2.56) 
0.095*** 
(5.42) 
0.085*** 
(5.13) 
0.108*** 
(4.24) 
0.113*** 
(3.52) 
Public employees 0.310*** 
(5.13) 
0.228*** 
(8.01) 
0.205*** 
(7.17) 
0.218*** 
(4.24) 
0.158*** 
(3.43) 
Managers 0.113** 
(2.28) 
0.102*** 
(3.23) 
0.163*** 
(4.30) 
0.210*** 
(4.60) 
0.186*** 
(3.00) 
Married 0.047** 
(2.12) 
0.033** 
(2.24) 
0.030* 
(1.69) 
0.32* 
(1.73) 
0.010 
(0.30) 
Head of Household 0.036 
(1.62) 
0.032* 
(1.86) 
0.035** 
(2.11) 
0.022 
(1.00) 
0.030 
(0.96) 
Mills ratio -0.183 
(-1.08) 
-0.113 
(-1.02) 
-0.087 
(-1.06) 
-0.074 
(-0.70) 
-0.030 
(-0.16) 
Mills ratio^2 0.089 
(0.85) 
0.024 
(0.31) 
0.015 
(0.30) 
0.006 
(0.11) 
-0.025 
(-0.18) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       Note: the table reports coefficient estimates of diffent quantile regression and the test t are reported in parenthesis. 
Bootstrap standard errors are obtained with 50 replications. *** Significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5% 
and * significant at the 10%.   
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Tab 8: Quantile wage regression with selectivity correction, male 
 Quantile 
 10th 25th 50° 75th 90th 
Temporary -0.197*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.139*** 
(-6.10) 
-0.121*** 
(-5.94) 
-0.085*** 
(-3.18) 
0.006 
(0.09) 
Age 0.020** 
(2.00) 
0.009 
(1.19) 
-0.009* 
(-1.70) 
-0.021** 
(-2.60) 
-0.030** 
(-2.27) 
Age^2 -0.001* 
(-1.70) 
0.000 
(-1.00) 
0.000** 
(2.06) 
0.000*** 
(2.93) 
0.001*** 
(2.74) 
Experience 0.004 
(0.97) 
0.008** 
(2.21) 
0.015*** 
(5.47) 
0.015*** 
(3.52) 
0.016*** 
(2.61) 
Experience^2 -0.001 
(-1.11) 
0.000** 
(-2.40) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.69) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.10) 
Tenure 0.007** 
(2.15) 
0.005** 
(2.58) 
0.004** 
(1.98) 
0.003 
(1.13) 
0.002 
(0.53) 
Tenure^2 -0.001 
(-1.40) 
0.000* 
(-1.74) 
0.000 
(-1.31) 
0.000 
(-0.58) 
0.000 
(0.21) 
Education      
University or more 0.181*** 
(4.41) 
0.232*** 
(4.92) 
0.314*** 
(11.26) 
0.325*** 
(5.93) 
0.378*** 
(6.10) 
High school 0.099*** 
(2.76) 
0.085*** 
(3.26) 
0.121*** 
(5.49) 
0.128*** 
(2.94) 
0.114*** 
(2.60) 
Professional school 0.095*** 
(2.78) 
0.091*** 
(3.14) 
0.085*** 
(3.07) 
0.120*** 
(2.66) 
0.146*** 
(2.92) 
Middle school 0.053* 
(1.69) 
0.041 
(1.62) 
0.046** 
(2.46) 
0.043 
(1.10) 
0.026 
(0.69) 
North-West -0.070*** 
(-3.66) 
-0.031** 
(-2.44) 
-0.015 
(-1.31) 
-0.019 
(-1.05) 
-0.040** 
(-2.16) 
Center -0.047** 
(-2.35) 
-0.019 
(-1.35) 
-0.014 
(-0.93) 
-0.008 
(-0.45) 
-0.006 
(-0.22) 
South -0.217*** 
(-7.24) 
-0.119*** 
(-5.84) 
-0.073*** 
(-4.31) 
-0.059*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.066** 
(-2.02) 
Islands -0.177*** 
(-7.34) 
-0.111*** 
(-4.64) 
-0.067*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.040 
(-1.63) 
-0.053 
(-1.32) 
Firm dimension      
From 5 to 19 0.104*** 
(3.18) 
0.047* 
(1.96) 
0.071*** 
(4.00) 
0.057** 
(2.22) 
0.041 
(1.02) 
From 20 to 49 0.133*** 
(4.01) 
0.085*** 
(2.94) 
0.110*** 
(5.74) 
0.099*** 
(3.56) 
0.108** 
(2.19) 
From 50 to 99 0.167*** 
(4.42) 
0.094*** 
(3.21) 
0.80*** 
(4.11) 
0.050 
(1.64) 
0.021 
(0.56) 
From 100 to 499 0.170*** 
(4.29) 
0.113*** 
(3.62) 
0.166*** 
(9.36) 
0.163*** 
(5.25) 
0.163*** 
(3.52) 
Over 500 0.216*** 
(4.75) 
0.159*** 
(5.91) 
0.187*** 
(7.83) 
0.196*** 
(5.50) 
0.182*** 
(3.83) 
Occupation      
White collars 0.109*** 
(3.83) 
0.108*** 
(5.29) 
0.107*** 
(8.44) 
0.108*** 
(6.73) 
0.131*** 
(4.05) 
Public employees 0.225*** 
(5.23) 
0.122*** 
(3.30) 
0.177*** 
(6.88) 
0.178*** 
(4.24) 
0.197*** 
(4.17) 
Managers 0.226*** 
(7.17) 
0.219*** 
(7.26) 
0.238*** 
(9.55) 
0.271*** 
(7.38) 
0.318*** 
(6.35) 
Married 0.073*** 
(3.68) 
0.058*** 
(3.57) 
0.073*** 
(6.25) 
0.076*** 
(4.36) 
0.052** 
(2.24) 
Head of Household 0.043*** 
(2.61) 
0.029** 
(2.43) 
0.045*** 
(4.39) 
0.062*** 
(4.97) 
0.030 
(1.33) 
Mills ratio -0.044 
(-0.34) 
-0.178** 
(-1.99) 
-0.084 
(-1.13) 
-0.178** 
(-1.98) 
-0.263* 
(-1.81) 
Mills ratio^2 -0.022 
(-0.17) 
0.120* 
(1.71) 
0.034 
(0.68) 
0.104 
(1.36) 
0.124 
(1.07) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       Note: the table reports coefficient estimates of diffent quantile regression and the test t are reported in parenthesis. 
Bootstrap standard errors are obtained with 50 replications. *** Significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5% 
and * significant at the 10%.   
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Tab. 9: Quantile regression (Machado-Mata) decomposition of the wage differentials 
between temporary and permanent workers 
       
 Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction 
 All sample Female Male All sample Female Male 
Quantile 0.10       
Raw 
differences 
-0.378 -0.405 -0.361 -0.375 -0.406 -0.355 
Characteristics -0.168 -0.169 -0.166 -0.181 -0.178 -0.166 
Coefficients -0.209 -0.235 -0.194 -0.193 -0.227 -0.189 
Quantile 0.20       
Raw 
differences 
-0.309 -0.317 -0.300 -0.304 -0.311 -0.299 
Characteristics -0.161 -0.153 -0.159 -0.173 -0.162 -0.165 
Coefficients -0.147 -0.164 -0.141 -0.131 -0.149 -0.133 
Quantile 0.30       
Raw 
differences 
-0.287 -0.278 -0.286 -0.287 -0.276 -0.289 
Characteristics -0.158 -0.152 -0.152 -0.167 -0.160 -0.164 
Coefficients -0.128 -0.125 -0.134 -0.119 -0.116 -0.125 
Quantile 0.40       
Raw 
differences 
-0.272 -0.252 -0.274 -0.271 -0.254 -0.275 
Characteristics -0.159 -0.154 -0.152 -0.167 -0.161 -0.164 
Coefficients -0.112 -0.098 -0.122 -0.104 -0.092 -0.111 
Quantile 0.50       
Raw 
differences 
-0.265 -0.241 -0.274 -0.263 -0.244 -0.276 
Characteristics -0.160 -0.160 -0.154 -0.166 -0.165 -0.167 
Coefficients -0.105 -0.080 -0.120 -0.097 -0.079 -0.109 
Quantile 0.60       
Raw 
differences 
-0.261 -0.225 -0.283 -0.261 -0.231 -0.285 
Characteristics -0.162 -0.162 -0.156 -0.168 -0.166 -0.167 
Coefficients -0.098 -0.063 -0.127 -0.093 -0.064 -0.118 
Quantile 0.70       
Raw 
differences 
-0.259 -0.211 -0.290 -0.258 -0.214 -0.288 
Characteristics -0.168 -0.173 -0.161 -0.170 -0.171 -0.167 
Coefficients -0.091 -0.037 -0.128 -0.088 -0.043 -0.120 
Quantile 0.80       
Raw 
differences 
-0.241 -0.183 -0.285 -0.244 -0.187 -0.279 
Characteristics -0.177 -0.186 -0.163 -0.176 -0.181 -0.167 
Coefficients -0.064 0.002 -0.122 -0.068 -0.006 -0.111 
Quantile 0.90       
Raw 
differences 
-0.176 -0.139 -0.223 -0.180 -0.152 -0.223 
Characteristics -0.184 -0.209 -0.161 -0.181 -0.203 -0.168 
Coefficients 0.007 0.070 -0.062 0.001 0.050 -0.055 
     Note: Shiw, 2006. Machado-Mata decomposition, using Melly (2006) estimator. 
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Figure 2: Coefficient estimates for temporary dummy by sex 
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Note: confidence intervals extend to 95% in either direction. Horizontal lines represent OLS estimates with 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3a: price differential by educational level, university 
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Note: Machado and Mata decomposition. Variables controlled for in the regression are age, experience, tenure, 
marital status, household dummies, firm size, occupation, region. 
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      Fig. 3b: price differential by educational level, high and professional school 
    
-.5
0
.5
1
Lo
g 
w
ag
e 
ef
fe
ct
s
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Quantile
Effects of coefficients(discrimination)
 
Note: Machado and Mata decomposition. Variables controlled for in the regression are age, experience, tenure,  marital 
status, household dummies, firm size, occupation, region. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3c: price differential by educational level, middle and elementary school 
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Note: Machado and Mata decomposition. Variables controlled for in the regression are age, experience, tenure,   
marital status, household dummies,  firm size, occupation, region. 
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Fig. 3: Machado-Mata decomposition for young workers (16-35 years) 
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Note: Machado and Mata decomposition. Variables controlled for in the regression are age, experience, tenure,   
marital status, household dummies, firm size, occupation, region. 
 
 
Fig 4: Machado-Mata decomposition for the workers resident in the North 
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Note: Machado and Mata decomposition. Variables controlled for in the regression are age, experience, tenure,   
marital status, household dummies, firm size, occupation. 
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Fig 5: Machado-Mata decomposition for the workers resident in the South 
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Note: Machado and Mata decomposition. Variables controlled for in the regression are age, experience, tenure, 
marital status, household dummies, firm size, occupation. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6: Machado-Mata decomposition for the workers in public sector 
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Note: Machado and Mata decomposition. Variables controlled for in the regression are age, experience, tenure, 
marital status, household dummies, firm size, occupation, region. 
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Fig 7: Machado-Mata decomposition for the workers in private sector 
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Note: Machado and Mata decomposition. Variables controlled for in the regression are age, experience, tenure, marital 
status, household dummies, firm size, occupation, region. 
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Table 9: IV quantile treatment effect of temporary status 
 
      
 10th  25th  50th  75th  90th 
 Female 
2SLAD  -0.044 
(-0.84) 
-0.067** 
(-2.37) 
-0.043* 
(-1.71) 
-0.039 
(-1.30) 
-0.022 
(-0.49) 
QTE with 
individual 
variables 
-0.430*** 
(-4.01) 
-0.364*** 
(-5.84) 
-0.312*** 
(-5.21) 
-0.292*** 
(-5.56) 
-0.208** 
(-2.28) 
QTE with 
individual and 
occupation 
variables 
-0.265** 
(-2.25) 
-0.173** 
(-2.33) 
-0.164*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.127 
(-1.58) 
-0.010 
(-0.08) 
      
 Male
2SLAD -0.061 
(-1.51) 
-0.046* 
(-1.91) 
-0.056*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.071*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.069* 
(-1.81) 
QTE with 
individual 
variables 
-0.344*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.244*** 
(-5.07) 
-0.201*** 
(-4.46) 
-0.178*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.090 
(-0.75) 
QTE with 
individual variable 
-0.218** 
(-2.15) 
-0.170*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.144*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.151** 
(-2.16) 
-0.098 
(-0.80) 
Note: the Quantile Treatment Effect estimator applies the Abadie, Angrist and Imbens 
(2002). The IVQR (2LAD and QTE) standard errors are obtained via bootstrapping with 100 
replications. *** Significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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  Table 10: Summary of the Estimation Resuls 
   Quantile   
 10th  25th  50th  75th  90th 
Female
Quantile 
regression 
-0.145*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.099*** 
(-3.78) 
-0.082*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.054* 
(-2.57) 
0.043 
(0.57) 
QTE (1) -0.430*** 
(-4.01) 
-0.364*** 
(-5.84) 
-0.312*** 
(-5.21) 
-0.292*** 
(-5.56) 
-0.208** 
(-2.28) 
QTE (2) 
 
-0.265** 
(-2.25) 
-0.173** 
(-2.33) 
-0.164*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.127 
(-1.58) 
-0.010 
(-0.08) 
Self-
selection 
model (1) 
-0.129** 
(-2.16) 
-0.091*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.093*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.037 
(-1.47) 
0.058 
(0.98) 
Self-
selection 
model (2) 
-0.152*** 
(-3.64) 
-0.099*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.090*** 
(-3.68) 
-0.063** 
(-2.51) 
0.033 
(0.46) 
Male
Quantile 
regression 
-0.233*** 
(-4.73) 
-0.145*** 
(-6.04) 
-0.122*** 
(-5.11) 
-0.102*** 
(-4.45) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
QTE (1) -0.344*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.244*** 
(-5.07) 
 
-0.201*** 
(-4.46) 
-0.178*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.090 
(-0.75) 
QTE (2) 
 
-0.218** 
(-2.15) 
-0.170*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.144*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.151** 
(-2.16) 
-0.098 
(-0.80) 
Self-
selection 
model (1) 
Self-
selection 
model (2) 
-0.197*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.217*** 
(-4.84) 
-0.139*** 
(-6.10) 
-0.140*** 
(-4.71) 
-0.121*** 
(-5.94) 
-0.123*** 
(-6.28) 
-0.085*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.096*** 
(-4.04) 
0.006 
(0.09) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
Note: Standard errors are obtained via bootstrapping with 100 replications, test t are 
reported in parenthesis *** Significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.QTE (1) controls 
only for individual variable, while QTE (2) also for job characteristics. Self-
selection model (1) is identified through exogenous instrument (searching) while self-
selection model (2) relies only on non linearity of selectivity correction term. 
